quarta-feira, janeiro 12, 2005

DUPLOS CRITÉRIOS E ALDRABICES VARIADAS


Neste curto e incisivo artigo, expõe-se aquilo que muitos politicamente correctos pensam mas que poucos têm o descaramento de dizer: «que se deve tratar os povos do terceiro mundo com mais condescendência porque a sua cultura é diferente».
É a mesma treta monstruosa que se usa no seio das sociedades ocidentais para desculpar os crimes cometidos por gente de minorias não europeias.

Como se a lei não servisse, antes de mais, para travar os abusos, pouco interessando se quem comete os abusos é culpado ou não.

Como se todos os que fossem de determinado povo, fossem obrigados a terem determinado conjunto de valores: um oriental, pode chacinar em nome do seu credo, mas um ocidental é obrigado a ser humanista... é totalitarismo e relativismo cultural num só acto.

E o mais grave é quando a gentalha politicamente correcta, controladora dos meios de comunicação social - transformados, pela sua mão, em meios de comunicação sucial - envereda pela mentira e pela ocultação da verdade por motivações políticas. Passa-se precisamente isso no caso da relação dos mé(r)dia com o Islão e com o terrorismo feito em seu nome. Ainda ontem estive com atenção a uma notícia dada pela SIC(K) sobre o facto de as autoridades indonésias não poderem garantir a segurança de quem prestava auxílio humanitário... e nunca por nunca os jornalistas que deram a notícia se referiram, levemente sequer, às ameaças feitas por terroristas islâmicos a quem quer que por lá andasse armado em bom samaritano...

Leia-se aqui sobre as ameaças que já vão sendo dirigidas a ocidentais que prestam auxílio às populações vitimadas pelo maremoto de dia 26 do passado mês...

2 Comments:

Anonymous Anónimo said...

"Neste curto e incisivo artigo, expõe-se aquilo que muitos politicamente correctos pensam mas que poucos têm o descaramento de dizer: «que se deve tratar os povos do terceiro mundo com mais condescendência porque a sua cultura é diferente»."

A Cultura não é assim tão diferente que os crimes não sejam os mesmos cá e na terra deles!... Os próprios Antropólogos, à medida que foram deixando as crenças de que os outros Povos eram bárbaros, quase animais e até desprovidos de raciocínio e de linguagem, não deixaram de se surpreender com a universalidade de certos Princípios... Aliás, se a Esquerdelha acredita mesmo na treta do Mito do Bom Selvagem, que seja fiel a ele... Eles são naturalmente bons, logo, não têm desculpa...


Imperador

12 de janeiro de 2005 às 16:17:00 WET  
Anonymous Anónimo said...

The Global Rise of Ethnic Nationalism
contributed by Franklin Sanders
Eads, Tennessee



No modern nation so perfectly embodies homogenized modernist culture than Japan. But is the monolith cracking? In an October 1994 interview, Nobel Laureate Kenzaburo Oe, one of Japan's leading writers, painted an astonishingly different picture. "The Japanese, from the prime minister on down, claim that being a single race and culture strengthens the nation. That is not at all my feeling. There are various cultures in different regions, and each region has its own culture."

Toting up secessionist movements today, you quickly lose count: Basques, Bretons, Scots, Quebecois, Welshmen all clamor for independence or home rule. Even Schwabs and Bayers aren't too enthusiastic about Greater Germany. Ethnic realities have already dismembered World War I gerrymanders like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the Great Eater of Nationalities, the USSR, has vomited up its captive nations. Northern Californians suspect they'd be better off rid of Los Angeles, while Idaho and Montana know they'd rather be free.

We are witnessing a historic change of secular trend from centralization to decentralization, from "inclusion" to "exclusion." For two centuries and more the trend of social events has been concentrating power, but now that trend is reversing. Power is flowing away from centers (such as federal states) to regions and localities, from governments to individuals. While inclusionist events like NAFTA steal headlines, they are only paroxysms of the dying trend which point to the cycle's top, not its continuation.

Who has noticed the trend change? Analysts from all disciplines. Social observers and market technicians Robert Prechter and Dave Allman of Elliott Wave International, for example. Military strategist Martin van Creveld in his Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). Journalist Robert D. Kaplan in "The Coming Anarchy" (Atlantic Monthly, 2/94). Philosopher and social critic Ed Veith in Postmodern Times (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1994). And of course, the American Establishment whose seat of power has already been rattled by the changing trend.

For Southern patriots, the outlook couldn't offer more hope.

In Postmodern Times Dr. Veith sets the backdrop for these changes:

In nearly every sphere, from academic fields to new social phenomena, the assumptions that shaped 20th century thought and culture are being exploded. As we enter the 21st century, it seems clear the Western culture is entering a new phase, which scholars are calling "postmodern."

Postmodernism both levels and exaggerates the differences between them. Postmodernism fragments society into contending and mutually unintelligible cultures and subcultures. Even within a single society, people are segmenting into self-contained communities and contending interest groups. Christianity itself is ghettoized. From Bosnia to American universities, we see the emergence of a new tribalism.

What is producing this fragmentation? In part centralization's excess of success, in part technology, and in part the failure of old ideologies. IBM became just too big to manage, like the U.S. government. The computer revolution has decentralized decision making and work stations and exploded data access.

The demise of communism has robbed its artificial dialectical opponent, the anti-Communist West (a.k.a. "capitalism" or "democracy"), of all reason to live. For over 40 years the old formula of "closing the ranks before the Red threat" silenced the voices of diversity and dissent, but no longer.

Today ideological identity has wilted while ethnic identity (always as deeply rooted as life itself) has blossomed. In a world where all the religion-substitutes (from "anti-communism" to Shirley MacLaine-ism) have demonstrated irredeemable failure, ethnic identities return to religion to draw their strength.

Robert D. Kaplan took a trip to West Africa to watch fragmentation in action. The picture he paints in the 2/94 Atlantic Monthly isn't rosy.

West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. A pre-modern formlessness governs the battlefield, evoking the wars in medieval Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ushered in the era of organized nation states.

Kaplan foresees that refugees and peasants crowding into cities will rob national borders of their meaning and shift power into "less educated, less sophisticated groups" who know only one border: "culture and tribe." Refugees will bring cultural disputes to weaken the U.S. and Europe. Altogether disregarding present national borders, these population shifts will remake the identities of civilizations after the image of religion and ethnicity. Bristling with gloomy adjectives, Kaplan denounces the future:

The political and cartographic implications of postmodernism will be an epoch of themeless juxtapositions in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms.

Ethnic identification, Kaplan predicts, will form the most cohesive social force in the immediate future. How will these trends affect the U.S.?

Many factors will make the U.S. less of a nation than it is today, even as its gains territory following the peaceful dissolution of Canada. Quebec, based on the bedrock of Roman Catholicism and Francophone ethnicity, could yet turn out to be North America's most cohesive and crime-free nation-state. (It may be a smaller Quebec, though, since aboriginal peoples may lop off northern parts of the province.) "Patriotism" will become increasingly regional as people in Alberta and Montana discover that they have far more in common with each other than they do with Ottawa or Washington, and Spanish-speakers in the Southwest discover a greater commonality with Mexico City. As Washington's influence wanes, and with it the traditional symbols of American patriotism, North Americans will take psychological refuge in their insulated communities and cultures (emphasis added).

Military historian Martin van Creveld teaches history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In The Transformation of War he predicts the end of war as we have known it. His thesis is simple. Technology has made war waged by nation states so costly that conventional warfare is now obsolete. The massive technospasm that pulverized Iraq may be the dinosaur's last lunge. Conventional military organization offers no protection against the terrorist army that strikes and then melts into the populace, leaving no target for technology. The U.S. looked great in Kuwait, but a bit ragged in Mogadishu. The same military machine that incinerated Iraqis by the thousands lurched helplessly from side to side when facing hit-and-run Somalis in "technicals," pick-up trucks with machine guns welded to their beds.

The wars of the future will be "low-intensity conflicts" (LICs). In developed countries LICs may be called "terrorism" or "police work." They rarely involve regular armies on both sides, but usually regulars on one side and guerrillas--including civilians, women, & children--on the other. Most of all, LICs do not rely on high-technology collective weaponry, "the pride and joy of any modern armed force."

The trend toward decentralization has not escaped notice of the American Establishment. In the Council on Foreign Relations' influential policy journal, Foreign Affairs, various articles in recent years have addressed international fragmentation. As the old ideologies crumble, ethnicity and irredentism threaten Establishment control. Meanwhile the Insiders have been considering the best ways to hijack the trend and preserve their power.

"The Clash of Civilizations?" (Summer '93 Foreign Affairs) claims, "The clash of civilizations (i.e. culture) will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." The author of this piece, Samuel P. Huntington, is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard. Huntington writes,

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be--the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural (emphasis added).

According to Huntington the clash of civilizations is the latest phase in conflict's evolution. From the Peace of Westphalia until the French Revolution, Western conflicts arose largely among princes trying to expand power and territory. From the French Revolution until the end of World War I, nations fought rather than princes. From World War I until the Cold War's end came the wars of ideology with their transnational superpowers. As international conflict moves out of its Western phase, civilizations will face off, the West against the non-West and non-Western civilizations against each other.

What interests us here is not Huntington's shifting the focus from West to non-West, but from ideological and political goals to cultural clashes. He defines a civilization as "the highest cultural grouping of people and [their] broadest level of cultural identity. . .short of that which distinguishes humans from other species." Both objective elements (language, history, religion, customs) and the people's subjective self-identification define civilizations.

These differences [among civilizations] are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities.

What will this mean for multicultural empires?

In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another.

While admittedly Huntington focuses his eyes on non-Western countries, he misses what's right under his nose in the West. The same centrifugal cultural forces that drive Kenzaburo Oe away from Tokyo and Armenians away from Moscow drive Southerners away from New York, Washington, and Hollywood. As the U.S. government and Yankee culture has become more and more self-consciously pagan, their assault on the South's Christianity and identity has sharpened. This only reinforces our other cultural differences: "history, language, culture, tradition, different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy . . . the product of centuries" in Huntington's words.

Over 125 years of Reconstruction has failed to erase Southern identity. Day by day kindred national feelings grow around the globe, reflecting a secular trend to decentralization and fragmentation that will continue for centuries. Whether this will enable the South to make a better bargain for autonomy within a U.S. framework, or enable us to form our own nation, is a tactical question yet to be answered. What is clear, however, is that this time, the trend is our friend.

Franklin Sanders is a noted scholar, author of several books, publisher of the "Moneychanger" newspaper, and a well-known conference speaker.


Do site http://dixienet.org/


Imperador

13 de janeiro de 2005 às 13:27:00 WET  

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